We analyze under what conditions credit markets are efficient in providing loans to entrepreneurs who can start a new project after previous failure. An entrepreneur of uncertain talent chooses the riskiness of her project. If banks cannot perfectly observe the risk of previous projects, two equilibria may coexist: (1) an inefficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk project and has no access to finance after failure; and (2) a more efficient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes high-risk projects and gets financed even after an endogenously determined number of failures.
Introduction
What determines the level of entrepreneurial activity in an economy? One key variable is the extent to which failed entrepreneurs are excluded from further entrepreneurial …nance.
European and Japanese …nanciers, for instance, are perceived to be more reluctant to …nance a failed entrepreneur's restart than their American counterparts. It therefore has become commonplace to praise the US'lower "stigma of failure"as the source of its higher entrepreneurship rates 1 and consequently of its competitive edge in terms of the ability to innovate, commercialize and grow. 2 In this paper, we present endogenous risk choice as an explanation for why economies with identical cultural and institutional constraints can experience di¤erent levels of the "stigma of failure". If the "stigma of failure"is high and banks provide credit only to those who have never failed, entrepreneurs will choose low-risk projects. In this economy, failure indicates low entrepreneurial talent. If the "stigma of failure" is low and banks provide credit to failed entrepreneurs, new entrepreneurs will be more inclined to experiment with novel (and more risky) business ideas. Failure at the beginning of an entrepreneurial career then indicates bad luck rather than low entrepreneurial talent.
To get an intuition for the model, imagine an entrepreneur who can undertake one of two projects, a low-risk project or a high-risk project. Both projects have no investment costs. The low-risk project yields a safe return of y L > 0. The high-risk project fails with probability p H 2 (0; 1) and then yields a return of 0. It succeeds with probability 1 p H and then yields a return of y H > y L . The expected return of the low-risk project is higher than the expected return of the high-risk project, y L > (1 p H ) y H . If the entrepreneur has only one chance to undertake a project, she should clearly choose the low-risk project.
However, assume now that, in the case of success, she works on the project and enjoys its returns; while in the case of failure, she can start a new project and faces the same choice. 3 What project should the entrepreneur now choose? If she chooses the low-risk project, she will earn y L . If she always chooses the high-risk project, she will succeed for sure after …nite time and earn y H . Therefore, it is optimal to go for the high-risk project.
In our model, there are two complications to this scenario. First, there are investment 1 GEM (2008) reports that in 2007, 10.8% of adults were engaged in early-stage entrepreneurship in the US as compared to only 5.4% in the EU or 5.4% in Japan. 2 See Bottazzi et al: (2003) , EU Commission (2000), SME Agency (1999) or Wennekers et al: (2006) . 3 For example, both projects could be a business that has no value except for the human capital of the entrepreneur (such as a gourmet restaurant). Returns only materialize if the entrepreneur runs the project during her entire professional life. Another interpretation is that once the entrepreneur has established a successful business, she gets settled such that her costs of starting a new business become prohibitively large.
costs that cannot be …nanced by the entrepreneur herself. She has to apply for a loan on a competitive credit market. Second, her entrepreneurial talent, which is either high or low, in ‡uences her probability of success, but is unknown to her and to banks. Only the distribution of talent is common knowledge. The entrepreneur and banks learn about her talent from the outcome of the project. However, learning depends on the project's risk:
failure with a low-risk (high-risk) project implies a relatively low (high) probability of high talent. Given that the ex-ante probability of high talent is su¢ ciently close to unity, the …rst-best outcome is as follows. The entrepreneur …rst undertakes high-risk projects.
After continuous failures, she undertakes the low-risk project. Failure with the low-risk project discloses low talent, therefore she stops undertaking projects at all.
Under what circumstances is the …rst-best outcome an equilibrium outcome and what other equilibria exist? We consider three di¤erent informational settings: perfect information (P I), private information of banks (P IB) and imperfect information (IM ). Under P I, banks can observe both the entrepreneur's past and present risk choices. In this setting, all parties equally learn about her talent. Hence, only the …rst-best outcome is a sequential equilibrium. Under P IB, banks only observe the risk of projects in their own loan portfolio. Several equilibria may now co-exist. In the …rst equilibrium, the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk project and, if it fails, does not get any more loans. This is due to the fact that only one bank observes the entrepreneur's choice. This bank becomes a monopolistic supplier of …nance if all other banks expect that the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk project. This equilibrium is ine¢ cient since the entrepreneur undertakes the low-risk project too early. In the second equilibrium, the entrepreneur …rst undertakes high-risk projects and then, after continuous failures, a low-risk project.
Under IM , banks never observe the risk of projects. This causes a moral hazard problem. The entrepreneur chooses the low-risk project only if the expected payo¤ of the high-risk project is su¢ ciently small relative to that of the low-risk project. As under P IB, multiple equilibria may again exist. Also the pareto-ranking remains the same. Yet, if the expected payo¤ of the high-risk project is close to that of the low-risk project, the entrepreneur will only undertake high-risk projects in equilibrium. Thus, if the ex-ante probability of high talent is su¢ ciently close to unity, multiple rounds of project …nancing must occur in equilibrium. We may then get a non-monotonic relationship between bank information and potential credit market ine¢ ciency: under P I, the outcome is always e¢ cient, while under P IB, there is always an equilibrium with only one period of project …nancing. This equilibrium may be strictly dominated by any equilibrium under IM in which the entrepreneur untertakes several high-risk projects.
In addition, we study the equilibrium set in the presence of a credit register that informs all banks about the interest rates of previously chosen loan contracts. Under P IB, such a credit register can ensure the existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium. The reason is that the register transmits the entrepreneur's risk choice to the extent that if the entrepreneur chose a contract with a very low loan rate, this may indicate that she undertook a low-risk project (otherwise, the bank that o¤ered this contract would have made negative expected pro…ts). In this case, banks then stop o¤ering loans. As long as it is unpro…table to undertake a low-risk project that is …nanced with a loan tailored for high-risk projects, there will be an equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes projects as in the …rst-best outcome. Under IM , a credit register can have the same e¤ect.
These results yield a number of policy implications. A bank's ability to observe both past and present entrepreneurial risk choices may be crucial in preventing credit market ine¢ ciencies. Detailed credit registers help to accomplish this task because past loan rates may indicate whether a failed business was a high-or low-risk project. Furthermore, we
show that with asymmetric information about past risk choices, potential gains from an increase in the population's entrepreneurial talent might not fully be realized.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a literature review in Section 2, Section 3 introduces the model and characterizes the …rst-best outcome. Section 4 analyzes the model under di¤erent informational settings. Section 5 discusses policy implications. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Related Literature
A considerable empirical literature tries to explain cross-country di¤erences in the "stigma of failure"by using persistent institutional or cultural characteristics. 4 . 5 For instance, Burchell and Hughes (2006) …nd that GDP growth is not related to failure tolerance, but positively related to second chancing willingness. Surveys, however, show more failure tolerance but less second chancing willingness in the US than in the EU. In the US, the stigma should thus be higher and entrepreneurship rates lower than in the EU, which contradicts empirical evidence.
Several papers study models of entrepreneurial …nance with asymmetric information and …nd multiple equilibria. Gromb that many (few) agents become entrepreneurs. In contrast to these papers, we endogenize the number of rounds banks are willing to …nance an entrepreneur after failure. The driver of our results is the link between risk choice and bank lending. New entrepreneurs will choose risky (save) projects provided that banks (do not) …nance projects after failure.
Consequently, the average talent of failed entrepreneurs is high (low), such that multiple rounds of project-…nancing (do not) occur in equilibrium.
We also contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial risk-taking. A common expla- 
The Model
We consider an economy populated by an entrepreneur E and banks B k , k 2 f1; :::; Kg with K 2. 6 All agents are risk-neutral. E can undertake a project, which requires an initial investment of 1. She has no wealth on her own. Thus, the project needs to be …nanced by banks. If E does not undertake a project or banks do not o¤er any loans, the game is over and all of the agents'payo¤s are 0. Otherwise, E chooses a loan contract and 6 The results easily carry over to a continuum of entrepreneurs.
nature decides on the project's outcome. In case of success, project returns are realized, E pays the loan rate and the game is over. In case of failure, no payments are made, the …nancing bank loses its investment, and the game starts anew. Time is discrete and denoted by t 2 f1; 2; :::g, where period t > 1 is reached if and only if E undertook t 1 times projects that failed. There is no discounting between periods.
The Entrepreneur. In period 0, nature decides on E's entrepreneurial talent i , which is high (i = H) with probability 1 2 (0; 1) or low (i = L) with probability 1 1 . Talent is time-invariant and unobservable to E and banks. Only 1 is commonly known. E can undertake projects with high (j = H) or low (j = L) risk of failure p j . For simplicity, we normalize 0 = p L < p H < 1 and 0 L < H = 1. The project's return is determined by E's talent and choice of risk j: it is y j with probability (1 p j ) i and 0 with probability
The high-risk project yields higher returns, y L < y H . If E has high (low) talent, projects have positive (negative) value:
Banks. Banks compete in a Bertrand manner by o¤ering loan contracts. Their re…-nancing costs are normalized to 0. To apply the concept of sequential equilibrium (SE),
we use …nite actions sets. De…ne R(") = 1 + q" q 2 0; 1; :::;
where [y] + denotes the smallest integer higher than or equal to y. A contract o¤er of B k appears as (k; r; p), where r 2 R(") is the loan rate and p 2 fp L ; p H g the maximum riskiness of the project. If E chooses a contract (k; r; p) with p = p L , then E can only undertake the low-risk project. If p = p H , then E can undertake any project. We thereby allow banks to control the project risk (at a later stage, we drop this assumption). Without loss of generality, we assume that each bank o¤ers at most two contracts. Denote by C k t (C t ) the set of all contract o¤ers made by B k (by all banks) in period t. C t also contains the zero-contract (0; 0; 0). If E chooses this contract, the game is over and payo¤s are 0 for every agent in this period. Denote by C k (C) the set of all possible C k t 's (C t 's). In period t, E chooses at most one contract out of C t and, given its terms, the project risk j. If E has chosen contract (k; r; p) and risk j, then, in case of success, she earns maxf0; y j rg, while B k gets minfy j ; rg.
Strategies, beliefs and equilibrium. Denote by H E's strategy E is a sequence of action functions E t for every t 2 f1; 2; :::g, where
gives the contract choice and the project risk as a function of H E t and C t :
Denote by 
. The assessment ( ; ) is a SE if (i) in each period, E and banks maximize expected payo¤s for given beliefs and competitors'strategies, and (ii) it is the limit of a sequence
is a totally mixed strategy pro…le and [n] is uniquely de…ned from [n] by Bayes'rule.
De…nition 1.
A SE (assessment), in which E undertakes and banks …nance the highrisk project in the …rst 1 periods and the low-risk project in period , is called a P
SE (assessment).
Projects and the First-Best Outcome. Assume for a moment that 1 = 1 and banks are absent. Instead, E has "deep pockets"and …nances all projects by herself. Her expected payo¤ from always choosing the high-risk project, V H , amounts to
Solving for
Her expected payo¤ from choosing the
We make two assumptions. First, if E has only one chance to undertake a project, she will prefer the low-risk project:
Second, if she has in…nitely many opportunities to undertake a project, she will always
In the following, we assume that both (A1) and (A2) hold. 7 Now imagine that E has "deep pockets"and 1 < 1. In equilibrium, we have
for
Given that
, E does not undertake any projects in period t. As 1 < 1,
we have E t ! 0 for t ! 1. Therefore, she will not undertake high-risk projects in in…nitely many periods. We characterize the …rst-best outcome:
such that E with "deep pockets" maximizes her expected payo¤ for given 1 (i) only if she chooses j = H in all periods t t( 1 ) 1, and (ii) if she chooses j = H in all periods t t( 1 ) 1 and j = L in period t( 1 ). For each t 2 N, there is a^ 1 < 1, such that t( 1 ) > t whenever 1 >^ 1 .
Proof. See Appendix.
We will refer to this function a number of times. Without loss of generality, we assume in the following that 1 is high enough such that t( 1 ) > 1. Let V ( 1 ) be E's expected payo¤ if she has "deep pockets" and chooses j = H (j = L) in all periods t t( 1 ) 1
(in period t ( 1 )). An equilibrium is e¢ cient if and only if total expected payo¤s in this equilibrium equal V ( 1 ).
Equilibria Under Di¤erent Informational Settings

Perfect Information (P I)
We …rst consider a setting with perfect information (P I), in which banks can observe all of E's risk choices. Note that if " is su¢ ciently small, then there is a Nash equilibrium 7 Note that (A1) and (A2) can be satis…ed at the same time if and only if y L > 1. This is the case as both projects have a positive value as long as E has high skills.
in which banks …nance the project in period 1, but never thereafter. Given that E has only one chance to undertake a project, she chooses j = L. If she fails with this project, banks know that E has low talent. This information, in turn, justi…es the banks'strategy.
However, the threat of no o¤ers being made in period 2 if E has chosen j = H in period 1 is not credible. The reason is that all banks observe E's decisions and update their belief via Bayes'rule. If E has chosen the high-risk project, it is still pro…table for a bank to …nance her after failure. As banks compete in a Bertrand manner, E can undertake projects as if she had "deep pockets". Thus, we can state:
Proposition 2 If " is su¢ ciently small, then under P I, total expected payo¤s are V ( 1 )
in any SE.
Private Information of Banks (P IB)
We now relax the assumption that banks can perfectly observe the riskiness of all past projects. Instead, a bank can only observe the risk of projects in its own loan portfolio.
The risk of projects in other banks'portfolios remains unknown. Therefore, banks acquire private information about E. We consider an institutional setting with a credit register (P IB cr ) and one without (P IB). A credit register informs all banks about the loan rates of E's previously chosen loan contracts. Thus, under P IB cr , if E chooses contract (k; r; p) in period t, then r becomes publicly known in periods > t, while E's risk choice in period t is observed only by B k . Under P IB, banks only know the loan rates of their own contract o¤ers. 8 We …rst study the case with credit registers. Consider an assessment in which E chooses j = L in period 1 and no contract o¤ers are made in period t 2. This assessment can be a SE even if 1 is close to unity. To see why, assume that E deviates and chooses a contract (k; r; p H ) and j = H in period 1 instead of j = L. If her project fails, B k updates its belief about E's type, knowing that she has chosen the high-risk project. All other banks B k 0 , k 0 2 f1; :::; Kg n fkg, do not observe E's deviation and assume that E has chosen j = L in period 1. If they observe a high loan rate r, they may interpret this as a mistake by E. Consequently, these banks will refuse to …nance E's project in any period t > 1. This makes B k a monopolistic supplier of …nance to E. It can extract almost all rents from E, leaving her with an expected payo¤ of at most ". Therefore, it can be optimal for E to undertake the low-risk project in period 1.
In addition, there can be an equilibrium in which E undertakes projects as if she had "deep pockets". Consider a t( 1 ) P assessment. If E deviates and chooses a contract 8 Note that in the US, contract terms are not reported in credit registers, only success or failure.
(k; r; p L ) in period t t( 1 ) 1, the credit register discloses r. If r is too low (i.e. the bank that o¤ered this contract would make a negative expected pro…t if E chooses j = H in period t), then banks may infer that E has chosen j = L in t and therefore refuse to …nance her in future periods. We only have to rule out that it does not pay o¤ for E to choose a contract (k; r; p H ) and j = L, where r is such that the respective bank does not make negative expected pro…ts if E chooses j = H. This is implied by (A2) if y L is not too high relative to the risk of failure of a high-risk project.
Proposition 3 Suppose that y L < 2=(1 p H ). If " is su¢ ciently small, then under P IB cr , there exists a P SE for 2 f1; t( 1 )g. In any P SE with < t( 1 ) ( = t( 1 )), total expected payo¤s are less than (equal to) V ( 1 ).
In the absence of credit registers, the ine¢ cient 1 P equilibrium persists. However, this must not be true for a t( 1 ) P equilibrium. Note that under P IB, those banks that do not …nance E's project in period t t( ) 1 have no information about E's risk choice and the contract that E has signed in period t. Thus, it could be pro…table for E to undertake a low-risk project in a period t t( 1 ) 1 and then, in period t + 1, switch to another bank that assumes that E has chosen the high-risk project in period t. This cannot happen in equilibrium. Therefore, a t( 1 ) P equilibrium might not exist. In the example below, we study a scenario, in which an e¢ cient equilibrium exists under P IB cr , while it does not under P IB.
Consider now a t P assessment for some t > 1, in which the expected pro…t of each bank is at most ". If " is su¢ ciently small, E will not deviate to j = L in a period t < t whenever she is relatively sure that she has high talent, i.e. if E t is relatively high. Thus, for 1 su¢ ciently close to unity, a t P assessment can be an equilibrium under both P IB cr and P IB.
Proposition 4
Let t 2 N be given. If 1 is su¢ ciently high and " is su¢ ciently small, then under P IB cr and P IB, there exists a P SE for 2 f1; tg and total expected payo¤s in the 1 P SE are smaller than in the t P SE.
Proof. See Appendix. payo¤ of a 2 P assessment would be 1; 423, while the total expected payo¤ of a 1 P assessment would be 1; 412. Under P IB, only a 1 P SE exists, while under P IB cr , also a 2 P SE exists. If y H = 3:10, then (A1), (A2) hold and t(0:95) = 2. The total expected payo¤ of a 2 P assessment is now 1; 511. There exist a 1 P and a 1 P SE under both P IB and P IB cr . Finally, if y H = 3:50, then (A1), (A2) hold and t(0:95) = 3. For 2 f1; 2; 3g a P SE exists under P IB and P IB cr . Total expected payo¤s in the 3 P SE ( 2 P SE, 1 P SE) are 1:841 ( 1:781, 1:412).
Imperfect Information (IM )
We …nally turn to a setting with imperfect information, in which no bank can observe E's risk choices. It is no longer possible for banks to restrict E's options in the contract.
Therefore, banks can only o¤er contracts (:; :; p H ). Again, we consider a setting with a credit register that informs banks about the loan rates of previous contracts (IM cr ) and a setting without such a credit register (IM ).
Under imperfect information, banks face a moral hazard problem. E may be inclined to shift risk and undertake the high-risk project whenever banks o¤er loan contracts that guarantee non-negative pro…ts, only if E chooses the low-risk project. If and only if the following assumption on payo¤s holds, can there be equilibria in which E chooses the low-risk project:
To see why, consider an assessment in which E chooses j = L in period t and all banks charge a loan rate r in this period. E's risk choice does not a¤ect future loan rates.
Therefore, she cannot gain by choosing j = H in period t as long as
Thus, if
then E always chooses the high-risk project in equilibrium. If (A3) does not hold, then
Banks make non-negative pro…ts only if r > 1. Hence, in equilibrium (10) implies (9) .
The interpretation of (A3) is that the expected return of the low-risk project is su¢ ciently high relative to the expected return of the high-risk project such that risk-shifting is not pro…table. Note that (A3) implies (A1) and that (A2) and (A3) can simultaneously hold if y H > 2. Hence, we need to distinguish between two scenarios: one in which (A3)
does not hold and one in which (A3) holds.
Equilibria if (A3) does not hold. A violation of (A3) means that E will always choose the high-risk project and banks can make non-negative expected pro…ts in period t if and only if
De…ne the maximum number of periods banks are willing to o¤er loan contracts to E bỹ
We can state:
, and " is su¢ ciently small, then in each SE under IM cr and IM , E undertakes high-risk projects in at least (at most)t( 1 ) 1 (t( 1 )) periods. Furthermore, E never undertakes a low-risk project. In each of these SE, total expected payo¤s are less than V ( 1 ).
Clearly these equilibria are not pareto-optimal. In the period before banks stop o¤ering loans, E would prefer to undertake the low-risk project (given that the loan rate is adjusted accordingly). Unable to commit to choose j = L, she ends up realizing the hig-risk project.
As we will see below, total expected payo¤s in this equilibrium can be much higher than in the ine¢ cient 1 P SE under P IB cr and P IB, in which the banks'equilibrium strategies force E to undertake the low-risk project in the …rst period. We therefore obtain a nonmonotonic relationship between potential credit market ine¢ ciency and bank information if (A3) does not hold.
Equilibria if (A3) does hold. If (A3) holds and 1 is su¢ ciently large, then again multiple equilibria can occur. On the one hand, there can be a 1 P SE. The threat of not providing any further loans is credible since banks do not observe E's risk choice. On the other hand, there can be a t P SE for some t > 1 if 1 is su¢ ciently high. In such an equilibrium, banks correctly anticipate that E chooses j = H in all periods t < t and set their loan rates accordingly.
Proposition 6 Let t 2 N be given. If (A3) holds, 1 is su¢ ciently high and " is su¢ -ciently small, then under IM cr and IM , there exists a P SE for 2 f1; tg and total expected payo¤s in the 1 P SE are smaller than in the t P SE.
Again, a credit register may help to detect deviations by E. This is the case in the example below. However, without further restrictions on the payo¤ structure, a credit register per se does not guarantee the existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium. The reason is that in any t( 1 ) P assessment, E t( 1 ) may be so small (and therefore the loan rates so high) that E undertakes the high-risk project in period t( 1 ). holds and the equilibria for IM ( IM cr ) are the same as for P IB ( P IB cr ) in Example 1.
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Credit registers can therefore make a di¤erence under imperfect information. However, if y H = 3:5, then (A3) is violated and the only equilibrium outcome is that E chooses the high-risk project in the …rst three periods and does not get any loans thereafter. The total expected payo¤ in these equilibria is 1; 838 and therefore exceeds the total expected payo¤s of the ine¢ cient equilibria under P IB and P IB cr .
Policy Implications
Asymmetric Information. Economic theory has well established that asymmetric information can lead to an ine¢ cient allocation of credit. The …nancial contracting literature has focused on solutions of the moral hazard problem if banks cannot directly observe the entrepreneur's risk choice (via monitoring, collateral or incentive contracts).
We have shown that the credit market equilibrium can be ine¢ cient even if the moral hazard problem can be mitigated. In particular, this can happen if entrepreneurs can start a new business after failure and banks cannot observe the entrepreneurs'past risk choices. Policies that aim to change the nature of the equilibrium may not be e¤ective, as both entrepreneurs'actions and banks'expectations would have to be changed simultaneously. Consider, for example, the approach of the European Commission (2000, 2007) . It attemps to reduce the "stigma of failure"by advising entrepreneurs to choose higher risk levels. Entrepreneurs, however, will follow such advice only if banks change their policy at the same time.
Credit Registers. Information exchange between banks through credit registers can increase credit market e¢ ciency. 10 In our model, information about the loan rates of previous contracts can be crucial to ensure the existence of more e¢ cient credit market equilibria (in particular, under P IB and IM ). This information enables banks to infer E's previous risk choices from loan rates. An unpaid loan with a relatively low loan rate may indicate that the underlying project risk was low (otherwise, the bank would not have o¤ered this loan to the entrepreneur). Failure then discloses low entrepreneurial talent, preventing banks from granting further loans to her. In contrast, an unpaid credit with a high loan rate may indicate that the underlying project's risk was high, suggesting that its failure owes more to bad luck rather than low entrepreneurial talent. In this case, E probably deserves another chance. However, note that the loan rate alone does not reveal 9 We additionally have to show that risk-shifting does not pay o¤ in the period in which E is supposed to choose j = L. E's actions. Banks might also infer from a high loan rate that E undertook the low-risk project and-by mistake-has chosen an inappropriate contract. Therefore, the multiplicity of equilibria persists under P IB cr and IM cr .
Improving Entrepreneurial Talent. Another measure to increase entrepreneurial activity is the promotion of education that leads to the formation of relevant skills. Entrepreneurial education plays a substantial role both in economic development (see e.g.
Klinger and Schündeln 2010) and the EU's policy to increase entrepreneurship after failure (European Commission 2007). In terms of our model, these policies would increase the probability of having high entrepreneurial talent 1 . If banks have perfect information, then an increase in 1 has both a direct and an indirect e¤ect on equilibrium welfare.
The direct e¤ect is that loan rates decrease in all periods. The indirect e¤ect is that the number t( 1 ) of periods in which projects are …nanced (weakly) increases. Yet, if the informational setting is P IB, P IB cr (and in some cases also under IM and IM cr ), then the indirect e¤ect might not materialize. There always exists an equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk project and does not get …nanced after failure.
Therefore, an increase in 1 does not necessarily entail a positive e¤ect on entrepreneurial activity among those who fail. Unless the banks'policies and entrepreneurs'risk-taking behaviors become simultaneously coordinated to another equilibrium, only the direct effect unfolds.
Conclusion
We have analyzed a model of entrepreneurial …nance and risk taking where the extent to which failed entrepreneurs are excluded from further start-up …nancing is determined endogenously. The driver of our results is the evolution of banks' beliefs about an entrepreneur's talent and the interplay between these beliefs and her risk choices. If banks can perfectly observe the entrepreneur's actions, then the …rst-best outcome is realized in any equilibrium: she …rst undertakes a number of high-risk projects and then, after continuous failure, undertakes a low-risk project. The number of trials (weakly) increases in the ex-ante probability of high talent. This is not the unique equilibrium (eventually, this equilibrium does not exist at all) if banks can only observe the riskiness of projects in their own loan portfolio (P IB). Instead, there also exists an ine¢ cient equilibrium in which the entrepreneur undertakes a low-risk project and becomes excluded from …nance after failure. This ine¢ ciency is due to the fact that banks may expect the entrepreneur to undertake the low-risk project. Failure of low-risk projects indicates low talent. Therefore, outside banks may refuse to …nance her after failure. The bank that …nanced the project then becomes a monopolistic supplier of …nance to the entrepreneur. Hence, it is rational for the entrepreneur to undertake a low-risk project.
If banks do not observe the riskiness of projects (IM ), the equilibrium set depends on the payo¤ structure. Given that the expected return of the high-risk project is su¢ ciently close to that of the low-risk project, the entrepreneur always undertakes high-risk projects in equilibrium. This outcome is ine¢ cient. Yet, it may be much better than the oneshot …nancing equilibrium under P IB. If the expected return of the high-risk project is su¢ ciently small relative to that of the low-risk project, then multiple equilibria exist as under P IB.
We showed that sharing information about previous loan rates through credit registers can ensure the existence of an e¢ cient equilibrium under P IB (and for some cases also under IM ). A low loan rate may indicate that the entrepreneur undertook a low-risk project and therefore should not be …nanced after failure. Consequently, the entrepreneur cannot gain by realizing the low-risk project too early.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Take 1 as given. Whenever E chooses j = L and the project fails, E knows that her talent is low. She then does not undertake any further projects. Consider the set of assessments in which E chooses j = H in periods t 2 f1; :::; t 1g, j = L in period t , and no more projects thereafter. Denote by V (t ) t the expected payo¤ of E at the beginning of period t 2 f1; :::; t g under the assessment with t periods of project realizations. We have
and for t 2 f1; :::; t 1g
where E 1 = 1 and E t is given by (6) for each t 2 f2; :::; t g. Note that there must be a t such that V (t ) 1 is positive only if t 2 f1; :::; t g. We therefore …nd that t( 1 ) = min n g 2 f1; :::; t g j V
; t 2 f1; :::; t g o :
To prove the second claim, observe that
(A2) then implies
is continuous in 1 for all t 2 N. Thus, for each t 2 N there is a^ 1 < 1, such that t ( 1 ) > t whenever 1 >^ 1 .
Proof of Proposition 3
1 P SE. De…ne
and consider an assessment ( ; ) with the following properties:
In period 1, B k o¤ers contracts
A bank B k that did not …nance the project in period 1 has beliefs k t = 0 in all periods t 2 and therefore does not o¤er any contracts.
A bank that …nanced the project in period 1 has a belief in period 2 that is derived from Bayes' rule. As long as it is pro…table, this bank o¤ers contracts with loan rates equal to max fr 2 R(")g. E undertakes projects whenever possible.
In this assessment, the expected payo¤ of E in period 2 is 0 regardless of her choice in period 1. Therefore, it is optimal for her to choose a contract (k; r(L; 1 ); p L ) and j = L in period 1 if
( 1 ) (y L r(L; 1 )) (1 p H ) ( 1 ) (y H r(H; 1 )) ;
which is implied by (A1) given that " is su¢ ciently small. Facing Bertrand competition, no bank can deviate pro…tably in period 1. It remains to show that beliefs are consistent.
Consider a sequence (
[n] ;
[n] ) n2N with (
[n] ) ! ( ; ) in which [n] is such that E chooses j = L with probability (n 1) =n and j = H with probability 1=n in period 1 whenever she chooses a contract (:; :; p H ). Clearly, we have (6) ) unless it observes that in a period 2 f1; :::; t 1g, E had chosen j = L or had not chosen contracts with loan rates equal to r(H; E ) (where E is given by (6) ). In these cases, it does not o¤er any contracts.
In period t = t( 1 ), B k o¤ers contract k; r(L; and E t( 1 ) is given by (6)) unless it observes that in a period 2 f1; :::; t 1g E had chosen j = L or had not chosen contracts with loan rates equal to r(H; E ) (where E is given by (6)). In these cases, it does not o¤er any contracts.
Banks o¤er no contracts in any period t > t( 1 ).
Whenever banks o¤er contracts as described above, E undertakes a high-risk project in all periods t 2 f1; :::; t( 1 ) 1g and a low-risk project in period t( 1 ).
To show that this can be the outcome of a SE, assume that E deviates in period t < t( 1 ) and chooses a contract k; r(L; k t ); p L . Given the banks'strategy, the expected payo¤ of E in period t isṼ
and in a period t 2 f1; :::; t 1g it is V For 1 ! 1 and " ! 0, this term becomes y L 1, while E's expected payo¤ at the beginning of period t under the original strategy for 1 ! 1 and " ! 0 becomes 
Thus, (A2) ensures that E cannot pro…tably deviate in any period t < t if 1 is su¢ ciently high and " is su¢ ciently low. (A1) ensures that the same is true for period t. Following the same steps as in the …rst part of the proof of Proposition 3, we can show that banks'beliefs can be consistent in all periods. Facing Bertrand competition, banks cannot pro…tably deviate. Finally, if 1 is su¢ ciently high and " is su¢ ciently low, total expected payo¤s in the 1 P SE must be smaller than in the t P SE. Otherwise, it would pay o¤ for E to deviate in period 1 of the considered t P assessment.
Proof of Proposition 6
